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C O M M E N T S

The Water Marketing Solution
by Mark Squillace
Mark Squillace is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Natural Resources
Law Center at the University of Colorado Law School.

W

ater markets have special appeal in the western
United States where the prior appropriation
doctrine favors historic, low-value agricultural
water rights over other valuable water rights.1 Yet, despite
the allure of water markets for moving water, especially
from agricultural to urban use, the legal, political, and
practical obstacles to the operation of such markets have
proven far more elusive than market theory would predict.2
Although water transfers occur on a fairly regular basis in
most western states,3 they do not occur as quickly or as easily as they would likely occur in a free market, even where
Author’s Note: This Article is an abridged version of an article that
will appear in Volume 53, No. 1, of the Natural Resources Journal.
The longer version, titled Water Transfers for a Changing Climate,
provides an in-depth review of two case studies that are only briefly
reviewed in this Article—the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District’s Colorado-Big Thompson Project, and the evolving proposal
often described as the “Super Ditch,” which would facilitate
temporary transfers of agricultural water in the Arkansas Valley of
Colorado to urban use. As implied by the title, the long-form article
also offers insight into the importance of reforming water transfer
regulations in the face of likely diminished water supplies as a result
of climate change. This abridged Article was made possible in part
by the outstanding assistance of several Colorado students, including
Anshul Bagga, Laura Brown, and Lisa Smith.
1.	

The consumptive municipal use of water in Denver, Colorado, amounts to
234,000 acre-feet per year, which is equivalent to 2% of all of Colorado’s
statewide consumptive use. About Us, Denver Water’s Water Use, Denver
Water, available at http://www.denverwater.org/AboutUs/KeyFacts/. Metropolitan Denver has a gross municipal product of $152.8 billion, which is
approximately 66% of the Colorado State gross domestic product (GDP) of
$231.6 billion. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011, available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_metro/2011/pdf/gdp_metro0211.pdf. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, 2011, available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/
regional/gdp_state/2011/pdf/gsp0611.pdf. Irrigation in the state of Colorado accounted for 90% of the consumptive use within the state in 2005.
Estimated Use of Water in the United States, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior (2005), available at http://pubs.usgs.
gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344.pdf. Net farm income in Colorado accounted for
$745 million or approximately 0.3% of the state GDP in 2009. State Fact
Sheets: Colorado, U.S. Department of Agriculture (July 11, 2011), available
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/CO.HTM.
2.	 See A. Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources §2:13 (1988).
3.	 See Bonnie G. Colby et al., Procedural Aspects of State Water Law: Transferring Water Rights in the Western States, Water Transfer Symposium, 31 Ariz.
L. Rev. 697, 697 (1989) (summarizing the procedural differences in the
evaluation of water right change applications across eight western states).
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water supplies are stressed, and the transaction costs associated with many proposed transfers often prove prohibitive.4 Indeed, the costs, delays, and uncertainties posed by
water transfers have combined to discourage many municipal water suppliers from viewing such transfers as a viable
option for solving their water supply problems.5 In short,
the story of water transfers in the western United States is
largely a story of market failure.6
One consequence of the failure of water markets is that
many cities continue to turn to engineering solutions to
address water supply needs, despite the enormous environmental, political, and economic costs of such proposals,7
4.	

See, e.g., Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney, Watering Growth in Colorado: Swept Along by the Current or Choosing a Better Line, 6 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 411, 422 (2002-2003).
The minimal transaction costs of acquiring existing trans-basin
diversions for municipal use are a sharp contrast to the extreme
costs associated with newly proposed trans-basin diversions. For
example, the American Water Development, Inc. (AWDI) proposal to export water from the San Luis Valley to the Denver
Metro area consumed nine years and several million dollars in
attorneys’ fees and engineering fees associated with expert testimony presented in court. The Colorado Supreme Court ended
AWDI’s plans when it upheld the District Court’s dismissal of
AWDI’s water rights application.
American Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 357, 359, 368
(Colo. 1994).); see also Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 393 (1990).
5.	 See, e.g., Sarah Klahn, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Describing Drought
in Colorado, 6 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 519, 534 (2003) (“As in past
droughts, the legislature has determined that one solution is to build more
storage projects. . . . The legislature adopted Senate Bill 236, which requested voter approval to float $2 billion in bonds for reservoir construction as a
part of a so-called ‘drought-package.’”).
6.	 See, e.g., Loyal M. Hartman & Don Seastone, Water Transfers: Economic Efficiency and Alternative Institutions 1 (1970); see also James
F. Booker et al., Economics and the Modeling of Water Resources and Policies,
25(1) Nat. Res. Model. 168, 173 (2012) (“[C]ompetitive markets for water are rare if not absent throughout the world.”). See Bonnie G. Colby et al.,
Procedural Aspects of State Water Law: Transferring Water Rights in the Western
States, Water Transfer Symposium, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 697, 697 (1989) (summarizing the procedural differences in the evaluation of water right change
applications across eight western states); see also Charles W. Howe et al.,
The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water Transfers on the Area of
Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1200, 1202 (1990) (“A major U.S. Geological Survey-funded
study (MacDonnell, et al.) has found frequent water transfers in several
western states (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah) but infrequent transfers in
other states (e.g., California and Wyoming), the frequency being strongly
affected by the institutional structure for effecting transfers and the pressure on water supplies.”).
7.	 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Golblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n
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and the relative advantages of water transfers.8 If the political, legal, and practical problems associated with traditional
transfers could be fixed, the demand for new engineering
projects would likely disappear.9 One important aspect of
any legal reform then must be to address in a meaningful
way the very real problems that transfers have historically
created while at the same time finding ways to simplify and
streamline the transfer process.
Overcoming the obstacles to water transfers is not just
about promoting economic efficiency. It is also about
protecting the environment and minimizing impacts on
the communities in remote water basins that have often
become the target for the seemingly insatiable demands of
growing urban centers. The good news is that water transfers can be optimized and made more attractive with relatively modest reforms to current law.
This Article suggests concrete solutions to promote
the development of robust water markets. It begins with
a review of water transfers in the western United States
and historical water use patterns that help illuminate the
problem. It then considers opportunities for moving agricultural water to urban use by studying successful water
transfer systems. To those who know water allocation law,
it will come as no surprise that many of these systems have
evolved in the context of special purpose water districts10
and mutual ditch companies.11 Since special purpose districts and mutual ditch companies provide well over onehalf the water to water users in the West,12 focusing reform

8.	

9.	
10.

11.

12.

v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488, 17 ELR 20440 (1987); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631, 32 ELR 20516 (2001).
See, e.g., Douglas S. Kenney, Relative Costs of New Water Supply Options
for Front Range Cities, Phase 1 Report 21 (July 2010) (unpublished draft),
available at http://www.rlch.org/archive/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10_
RR_Kenneycostofwater1.pdf. (“[O]ur estimates of representative costs (in
$/AF) are as follows: new projects, $16,200; water transfers, $14,000; and
conservation, $5,200.”).
See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
It is difficult to simplify descriptions of these districts, other than to say that
they are quasi-governmental agencies organized in accordance with detailed
legislation adopted in the various states. John Leshy once aptly noted the
practical impossibility of generalizing about modern special water
districts. They are, in fact, rather like snowflakes, each with its own
unique form. Many of these typically lengthy statutes apply to only
one or a handful of districts, and only a few lawyers and district
managers may be familiar with their provisions.
John D. Leshy, Special Water Districts—The Historical Background, in Special Water Districts: Challenge for the Future (James Corbridge ed.,
1983).
See John H. Davidson, Mutual Ditch or Water Corporations, in Waters and
Water Rights, §26.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (explaining that mutual
ditch companies are “usually in the form of a non-profit corporation organized for the exclusive benefit of the users in a particular area who became
its stockholders,” with the goal of “provid[ing] a vehicle for organizing the
distribution of water so that the individual water users were relieved of the
burden of managing the ditch”).
See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy
and Markets, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 671, 688 (1993). In 1978, public water districts supplied 56.8% of California’s water, mutuals supplied 9.0%; public
water districts supplied 7.1% of Colorado’s water, mutuals supplied 69.9%;
public water districts supplied 24.7% of Wyoming’s water, mutuals supplied
30.7%. Id. tbl. 2.
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efforts on such agencies could be an efficient way to modernize water transfer law. The Article then derives lessons
from these examples and concludes with a series of recommendations for reforming western water law in ways that
will promote more sensible water management.
I.

Background

From its earliest incarnations, the prior appropriation
doctrine that evolved in most western states allowed perfected13 water rights to be transferred from their original
use to some other beneficial use.14 The interdependent
nature of most prior appropriation water rights has persuaded states to authorize such transfers only where they
can be carried out without injury to existing users.15 Such
injuries may occur, for example, where they reduce the
amount or timing of return flows.16 Moreover, to avoid
burdening existing users with the need to prove injury,
many states place the burden of showing “no injury” on
the proponent of the transfer.17
13. As a general rule, states do not allow parties to transfer unperfected rights,
that is, rights that have not been applied to the beneficial use for which
they were authorized, in part because of the fear that allowing such transfers would promote speculation. See, e.g., Catherland Reclamation Dist. v.
Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 433 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Neb.
1988); Green River Development Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339, 344
(Wyo. 1983).
14. At least one western state, Wyoming, initially prohibited transfers entirely.
See Wyo. Stat. §41-3-101 (2011), which to this day provides in relevant
part that “[w]ater rights for the direct use of the natural unstored flow of
any stream cannot be detached from the lands, place or purpose for which
they are acquired. . . .” This prohibition has since been superseded by an
express provision that allows transfers, but only under strict conditions.
Wyo. Stat. §41-3-104 (2011). Other western states have taken a more
liberal view of transfers, but generally subject to the no injury standard.
For example, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-172 (2011) allows water transfers
with some limitations. “A water right may be severed from the land to
which it is appurtenant or from the site of its use if for other than irrigation
purposes and with the consent and approval of the owner of such right may
be transferred. . . .” Id.
15. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-172(A)(2) (2011) states in relevant part that,
“[v]ested or existing rights to the use of water shall not be affected, infringed
upon nor interfered with, and in no event shall the water diverted or used
after the transfer of such rights exceed the vested rights existing at the time
of such severance and transfer. . . .” Cal. Water Code §1745.07 (2011)
states in relevant part that “[n]o transfer of water pursuant to this Article or
any other provision of law shall cause a forfeiture, diminution, or impairment of any water rights.”
16. See, e.g., Phoenix Water Co. v. Fletcher, 23 Cal. 481, 487 (Cal. 1863); Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities:
The Search for Smarter Approaches, 2 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y
27, 28 (1994-1995):
The understanding reached in Colorado is that a proposed transfer
should be considered in terms of its net depletive effects on the
stream and on the manner in which it would change the timing of
flows. A reduction in the historical availability of water to another
appropriator, either because of increased depletion by the new use
or because the new use changes the timing with which the water
is available to other appropriators, will be regarded as an injury to
those appropriators and will not be permitted.
17. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d
46, 58 (Colo.1999), which held in part:
[i]n a change of use and augmentation case, applicant seeking
change must demonstrate that the timing of diversions and the
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On its face, the no injury rule is simple and sensible. It
helps ensure that priorities among water users on a given
stream are not upset by changes to the system instigated
by an existing user or her successor.18 Unfortunately, as
currently implemented, the no injury rule often imposes
extraordinary transaction costs, primarily in the form of
legal and expert fees. In particular, uncertainties about
the scope and extent of injuries from a proposed transfer
encourage parties on both sides to hire experts to predict
an outcome that favors the legal position of their clients.19
In addition to the significant costs associated with proving or disproving injury, all of this also takes considerable
time, which means that a transfer applicant may not know
for several years whether her application will be approved
and, if so, how much water will be authorized for transfer
if it is approved.20
Arguably, much of the cost and uncertainty associated with water transfers is attributable to the resistance
of the agricultural community to any transfers that propose moving water out of agricultural use.21 This resistance

18.
19.

20.

21.

quantity of consumption for the changed use will not exceed those
of the perfected appropriation, and that return flows of native waters from the decreed use at its place of use—upon which junior
appropriators and prospective new appropriators often depend for
their supply-will not be diminished.
See also Farmer’s High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975
P.2d 189, 197 (Colo. 1999), which held in relevant part that “[i]t is the
water court’s duty to hear testimony regarding the alleged injurious effects
of the change of use of water and to aid the parties in crafting conditions of
water rights decree to prevent such injury.” Put differently, “[c]hanging the
place of diversion of adjudicated water rights cannot enlarge or expand the
water right at the expense of other appropriators or the state.” W.S. Ranch
Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 439 P.2d 714,718 (N.M. 1968).
MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 16, at 30-31. ����������������������������
(“At one level, such protection [the no injury rule] makes eminent good sense; transfers ought not to
leave other water users in the same system worse off.”).
Injuries may result not only from the loss of water resources from a particular basin, but also the loss of late season flows that often result from the
application of water to upstream agricultural lands. See Hall v. Kuiper, 510
P.2d 329 (Colo. 1973); see also John H. Davidson, Reallocation, Transfer, and
Change Elements, in Waters And Water Rights §14.04(c) (Robert E. Beck
ed., 1991).
See, e.g., supra note 4, at 420 (“Complex cases can stretch over years and
attract dozens of opponents. For example, litigation over Union Park extended from 1984 through 2000, and included over twenty parties.” Bd.
of County Comm’rs of County of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners
Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 329 (Colo. 2000)); id. at 421:
Although engineers can estimate the yield of a water right, adjudication is necessary to determine consumptive use. Thus, purchasers of existing rights for new municipal uses may not know in
advance the actual yield of the rights they are purchasing for transfer. The junior protection rule [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-902305(3) (2002)] guarantees in many, perhaps most, situations that
not all of a water right can be transferred, and it is not apparent at
the time of filing a change case which junior appropriators will be
injured and what will be necessary to keep them whole, even with
extensive engineering.
See also Bonny Colby Saliba et al., Do Water Market Prices Appropriately
Measure Water Values, 27 Nat. Resources J. 617, 621 (1987) (explaining
that when individuals are unable to ascertain the legal rights and restrictions
of a water purchase, they are unlikely to purchase a water right).
See, e.g., In re Application of Howard Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787, 788-89 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1988) (responding to protestants challenge that a transfer of water
rights to a ski resort harmed the public welfare); MacDonnell & Rice, supra
note 16 (“Purchases of agricultural lands in the Owens Valley and the associated water rights by the City of Los Angeles earlier in this century, provoked
so much controversy that it essentially ended water marketing as a way of
meeting urban water demands in California until the last ten years.”).
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stems, in part, from the threats that water transfers pose
to the economic stability of rural communities.22 Perhaps
most obviously, moving water from farms to cities usually means a loss of the economic activity associated with
the farmland itself.23 When cities buy irrigated farmland
for the purpose of transferring the water resources, they
have often engaged in what some have pejoratively called
“buy and dry”24 practices. Buy and dry refers to the situation where the buyer essentially abandons the land after
the water rights are transferred without adequate consideration of the need to restore the land to a stable and productive state.25 So, instead of reverting to native grasses that
might contribute to a bucolic setting, attractive to tourists
and new settlers, the land subject to buy and dry practices
may become infested with unattractive, opportunistic,
non-native weeds, that further diminish the prospects for
a vibrant rural economy. Reforms are likely to be viewed
skeptically by rural communities if they perceive a streamlined water transfer process as a vehicle for undermining
rural economies.
Irrigated agriculture is far and away the dominant consumptive use of water resources in the West.26 Thus, it
seems inevitable that cities looking for new water supplies
will cast their gaze toward agricultural communities. Agricultural water rights are also attractive because they tend to
be the most senior rights.27 While agriculture is an impor22. Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 Nat.
Resources J. 413, 428-30 (1989) (“Water right transfers threaten not only
county tax bases, but also the overall economic health of rural areas . . .
The overall quality and character of life can be undermined in areas where
historic irrigation suddenly is terminated.”).
23. Studies from California, Colorado, and Oregon confirm “that water availability is a significant determinate of farmland value.” Economic Impacts
of Climate Change on Agricultural Water Use in California, 15
(2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-5002005-054/CEC-500-2005-054.PDF and http://are.berkeley.edu/~fisher/
ClimateChange.pdf; Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model
Water Transfer Act for California, 4 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y
23, 40 (1996) (discussing loss of economic activity associated with transfer
of water); Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goemans, Economic Efficiency
and Equity Considerations in Regional Water Transfers: A Comparative Analysis
of Two Basins in Colorado 13 (2003).
24. See, e.g., 26th Annual Water Law Conference: Twenty-First Century Water
Supply, Use and Distribution: Do the Rules Still Apply?, 11 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 389, 405-06 (2008):
“[B]uy and dry” [is] the permanent transfer [of water] from agricultural use to municipal use that can dry the land. . . . [T]he transfer
is a one-time deal where municipalities buy shares in a ditch company, often far from the municipality, and the water is permanently
removed from irrigation use by the ditch company. The irrigator
and the region then can suffer from the limited or lost agricultural
productivity resulting from the water transfer.
25. See id.
26. For example, an estimated 90% of the total water consumed in Colorado
was used for irrigation in 2005. Estimated Use of Water in the United
States, supra note 1. In Montana, 96% of the total water consumed was
used for irrigation. Id. In California, irrigation accounted for 74% of total
state water use. Id.
27. See, e.g., Charles T. DuMars, Public Policy Considerations in State Water Allocations and Management, 42 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 24, 24-4 (1996)
(“While the demand for urban uses is increasing, most senior water rights
remain in agricultural uses criticized by some as economically inefficient.”);
Adam Schempp, Western Water in the 21st Century: Policies and Programs
That Stretch Supplies in a Prior Appropriation World, 40 ELR 10394, 10411
(Apr. 2010) (“Water rights can remain with lower value uses, such as agriculture (commonly the most senior water rights).”); see also Dudley D.
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tant component of the economies of these rural areas, it is
not a significant part of the overall economy in any western
state.28 Therefore, while the politics of reforming transfer
laws will undoubtedly prove daunting, even with proposals
that are sensitive to rural impacts, the legal obstacles posed
by changing existing water transfer laws are relatively easy
to surmount.

II.

Water Transfers and the Takings Clause

One of the great myths of western water law is that water
rights are property rights that are essentially inviolable.
Under this view, the no injury rule for water transfers is
effectively compelled by the U.S. Constitution. To be sure,
water rights are vested property rights, and unless those
rights are abandoned or wasted, they cannot generally be
reclaimed by the state without paying just compensation.29
But this is not to say that the use of these rights cannot be
managed or restricted in ways that go beyond the restrictions imposed in the original grant. Such post-acquisition
restrictions are common to most forms of property and do
not inevitably lead to a valid claim that the property rights
have been unconstitutionally “taken.”30
Moreover, for several reasons, water rights are among
the most tenuous forms of property, and as such they have
one of the least compelling claims to be free from government restrictions, even where such restrictions are imposed
after the rights are perfected. First, in every American state
with positive water law, water resources are owned by the
state. A water right gives only a right to use the water, and
while even use rights can be quite valuable, states have historically given them to water users for free.31 While this
largesse does not license the state to withdraw these rights
once they are granted, states have always claimed the power
to set rules to regulate, among other things, the allocation
of water, abandonment and forfeiture of rights, transfers of
water rights, and beneficial use of water resources. And as
with forms of real property, states may sometimes add new
rules or set new restrictions on existing water rights without compensating the owner. Those new rules are not likely
to lead to a valid “takings” claim unless they interfere with
the owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations.”32

28.
29.

30.

31.
32.

Johnson, An Optimal State of Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and Flexible
Market Prices, 57 Va. L. Rev. 345 (1971).
See Terry L. Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought
(1983); see also Harrison C. Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of
Western Water Resources, 66 Neb. L. Rev. 76, 78 (1987).
Compare Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed.
Cl. 313 (2001) with Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, 67 Fed.
Cl. 504 (2005). See also Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 Hastings W-NW J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 1 (2002).
See U.S. Const. amend. V (“. . . nor shall private property be taken for a public use without just compensation”); see also Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding post-acquisition restrictions
and corresponding diminution of value against a takings challenge). Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR
20528 (1978).
One notable exception is the state of Montana, which provides for leasing
large water rights from the state. Mont. Code Ann. §85-2-407.
See Penn Central, supra note 30.
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To be sure, claims that a state or federal rule gives rise to
an unconstitutional taking of a private party’s water rights
do sometimes arise, and are occasionally successful.33 One
strategy, for example, is to argue that a restriction that curtails the amount of water available to a user amounts to a
partial “physical taking” of the water. The U.S. Supreme
Court has suggested that a physical taking constitutes a
per se taking of property.34 But unless the state is physically
appropriating the water for its own use, the restriction is
more likely to be viewed as a regulatory restriction subject to the more forgiving test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.35 There, the Court held that a regulation that restricts
the use of property should be examined to determine “[t]
he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. . . .”36
Restrictions that do not interfere with the reasonable,
investment-backed expectations of the owner are unlikely
to be found to cause a taking. Given the widespread tolerance for minor injuries to water rights that occur under
the current prior appropriation system, it seems unlikely
that minor injuries to existing users that might result from
modest changes in the current water transfers system would
interfere with the distinct, investment-backed expectations
of the existing user.

III. The Economics of Water Transfers
Understanding why water markets have historically failed
to provide for the efficient reallocation of water requires a
basic understanding of microeconomic theory. A competitive market typically exhibits the following characteristics: (1) a large numbers of buyers and sellers; (2) products
that are fungible, or indistinguishable to consumers;
(3) consumers and producers with perfect information
about prices and quality; and (4) firms with equal knowledge of and access to relevant technology.37 Markets lacking one or more of these characteristics may fail to allocate
goods efficiently.
At first blush, water rights might seem to fit these characteristics reasonably well. Many people own water rights,
and many others are interested in buying those rights.
33. See Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002).
34. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426,
435-36 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation of private
property, however minor, results in a per se taking, regardless of the public
interest advanced by the occupation.); see also Klamath Irrigation District v.
United States, 635 F.3d 505, 41 ELR 20094 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Sacramento
Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175 (2010). As with any
property, the physical taking of a water right requires physical occupation,
such as a diversion, in order to implicate the Penn Central test.
35. 438 U.S. 104, 124, 8 ELR 20528 (1978).
36. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). The
Court also considered the “the character of the governmental action,” referring specifically to the notion that a physical invasion is more likely to
support a takings claim.
37. David Besanko & Ronald R. Braeutigam, Microeconomics 330
(2011). The authors suggest that water markets seem to fail primarily because water rights are not fungible and to a lesser extent because information
about price and value is likely imperfect.
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Basic information about the sale price of water is reasonably well-known,38 and interested parties have some sense
about the value of water in individual water basins.39 But a
closer look reveals some structural problems that will have
to be overcome if the free market in water is ever going to
thrive. In particular, under the current legal system, water
rights often fail the fungibility test because they are not
homogenous. Moreover, information about the price and
quality of water may be skewed by the limited number of
transfers and the dominant influence of the Colorado-Big
Thompson (CBT) market in the transfer picture.40
In order to be fungible, a water right must essentially
be the same anywhere it is available within a given geographic market. Put another way, if water rights were fungible, a buyer interested in purchasing an acre-foot of water
should be able to walk into a marketplace and purchase
that acre-foot of water at a negotiated price, and then take
that water to the desired point of end use. The location and
quality of that acre-foot of water may affect the price, since
it will have to be delivered to the point of use, and perhaps
treated to bring it to the quality required for that use. But
the value of property is commonly dependent on location
and quality, and such differences by themselves should not
deter water transactions. The real obstacle to the fungibility of water rights seems to be the uncertainty that the no
injury rule brings to the transfer.41 Uncertainty causes significant delays and denies the buyer the ability to know
exactly how much water will be available for use after the
transfer.42 Thus, the buyer cannot accurately compare the
cost of water available for transfer with water that might be
available from a water development project or some other
source.43 Moreover, this uncertainty greatly increases the
transaction costs associated with transferring water, and
overcoming this uncertainty is too often an expensive,
complex, and time-consuming task.44
38. David S. Brookshire et al., Water Resources Research 1 (2004).
39. Decisions to pursue engineering solutions, for example, are generally
weighed against the relative cost of acquiring water through transfers. See,
e.g., Northern Integrated Supply Project DEIS, supra note 5.
40. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. The CBT project is discussed
in greater detail at Part V.I.A. of the Article. See also Besanko & Braeutigam, supra note 37, at 330; Bonnie Colby Saliba & David B. Bush,
Water Markets 23 (1987).
41. Bonny Colby Saliba et al., Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Measure
Water Values?, 27 Nat. Resources J. 617, 621 (1987) (explaining that when
individuals are unable to ascertain the legal rights and restrictions of a water
purchase, they are unlikely to purchase a water right).
42. Id. at 645 (1987) (noting that legal, hydrologic, and economic uncertainties
are present in water markets and reduce market participation and distort
market prices); see also Transaction Costs as Determinants, supra note 4, at
3 (noting that because water transfers must go through the review of the
Water Court or State Engineer, and because the Water Court may impose
conditions upon the transfer, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-305(4)(a), the
final transfer is likely to contain terms not found in the original application
such as: restrictions on total volume, flow rate, and timing).
43. See Saliba et al., supra note 41, at 651 (explaining that information regarding the amount and price of water as well as the restrictions that will be
placed on the use of said water are essential in the valuation process of a
proposed transfer of water).
44. Uncertainties in water transfers lead to buyers and sellers bearing the cost
of risks that take the form of brokerage service fees, hydrology studies, and
legal representation. Transaction Costs as Determinants, supra note 4, at 3.
These transaction costs become prohibitively large for most prospective parties to a transfer as is evidenced by the proposed American Water Develop-
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As previously described, the no injury rule allows any
existing water user who might be affected by a proposed
transfer to block that transfer even for minor injuries that
might result from the proposed changes to the water system. Such injuries might include, for example, a change in
the timing of return flows.45 Consequently, a water right
taken from one location on a stream is not fungible with
a water right taken from another location on that same
stream if existing users are in a position to complain about
injuries, such as the loss of late-season return flows.
Importantly, this problem does not manifest itself with
storage water rights, which is why successful water markets
are so often associated with stored water.46 Stored water in
the western United States is typically collected in the spring
as snow melts in the mountains, and the owner’s priorities
are satisfied at the time of storage. Most of the large storage
projects are owned and managed by special-purpose water
districts and mutual ditch companies, which is one reason
that these agencies have proved more capable of transferring water efficiently.47
As already noted, one of the chief obstacles to making water rights fungible is the inadequate definition of
water as a property right. Western water law has traditionally defined water rights in terms of the amount of water
that can be diverted out of a stream.48 While this may be
a necessary requirement for identifying a property right
in water, it is hardly sufficient if the goal is to promote
a robust water market. This is because the system largely
functions on the basis of the amount of water consumed,
not the amount of water diverted.49 More specifically, the
diversion amount tells a prospective buyer very little about
the amount of water that might be available for transfer.
If water rights were defined both in terms of a diversion
amount and a consumptive use amount, the prospects for a
free market in water would brighten markedly.50 In particular, one can easily imagine a thriving market of consump-

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

ment, Inc. transfer that spent nine years in court and several million dollars
in attorneys and engineering fees. See American Water Dev., Inc. v. City of
Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 357, 359 (Colo. 1994); see also Nichols & Kenney,
supra note 4, at 422; see also Charles W. Howe et al., supra note 6, at 1200
(1990) (“Water sales and subsequent transfers may be negotiated over several years . . . There is no such thing as a clean-cut water transfer.”).
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-304(a)(II) (2011).
See, e.g., Margaret Bushman LaBianca, The Arizona Water Bank and the Law
of the River, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 659, 676 (1998); Morris Israel & Jay R.
Lund, Recent California Water Transfers: Implications for Water Management,
35 Nat. Resources J. 1, 13 (1995); see also Booker et al., supra note 6, at
206 (“Economists have long suggested that market institutions such as water rights transfers and water banks have the potential to increase economic
efficiency relative to traditional water allocation institutions. . . .”).
For a discussion of a robust water market and its accompanying storage
facilities, see notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 421.
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 52,
59 (Colo. 1999).
See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Public Water-Private Water: Anti-Speculation,
Water Reallocation and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado
Water Cons District, 10 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 1, 3 (2006) (suggesting
that consumptive use “effectively privatizes the water”); Antony Frank &
David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements for Agriculture, tbl.
1 Colorado Dept. of Agriculture (1995), available at http://cospl.coalliance.
org/fez/eserv/co:3072/ag92ir71999internet.pdf; Nichols & Kenney, supra
note 4, at 421.

Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

9-2012

NEWS & ANALYSIS

tive use amounts within a single water basin, and perhaps
even among multiple basins.
Of course, even defining water rights in terms of consumptive use would not by itself make transfers any easier.
Current law in most jurisdictions explicitly recognizes the
right of existing water users to block transfers if they suffer injuries, even where the transfer amount is limited to
consumptive use.51 However, a relatively simple change to
the law would require water rights to be defined in terms
of their consumptive use and to presumptively allow that
amount—perhaps subject to a small discount—to be transferred. Indeed, such a change would be easy to accommodate under the current legal regime, would likely cause no
greater injury than is already tolerated under other aspects
of the law, and could potentially limit other forms of injury.
For example, in every western state, agricultural water
users are free to grow any crop they can successfully cultivate. But the choice of crop greatly affects the amount of
water consumed. In Colorado, alfalfa typically consumes
nearly two acre-feet of water per acre, whereas sunflowers
consume 1.34 acre-feet of water per acre.52 Yet, an agricultural user may freely switch from sunflower to alfalfa,
even if such a change causes a significant injury to existing
users. Likewise, in most western states, agricultural users
are free to recapture and reuse water, so long as they recapture and reuse the water for the same purpose and on the
land for which the rights were appropriated, even if such
reuse increases the amount of water consumed.53 Finally,
measuring the amount of water diverted through a ditch
is far from an exact science, and measurement errors are
routinely tolerated, even if they might cause injury to existing users.54 Defining water rights in terms of consumptive
use would ensure that efforts to recapture and reuse, or
to change crops, would not result in the consumption of
water resources in excess of the legal allotment.
Furthermore, minor departures from the priority system are common in the prior appropriation system, and
are tolerated even where they might harm vested water
rights. So, for example, the fact that an inaccurate flume
might injure another water user by effectively allowing the
diversion of more than one’s entitlement55 or the fact that
51. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-304 (2011); Wyo. Stat. §41-3104(a) (2011).
52. Rachel Barta et al., Colorado High Plains Irrigation Practices Guide Water
Saving Options for Irrigators in Eastern Colorado, tbl. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/sr/14.pdf. See also Save the Poudre Coalition, A Review of the Likely Agricultural Impacts From the Northern
Integrated Supply Project, app. A (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.
savethepoudre.org/docs/stp_ag_impacts_analysis.pdf, citing the U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002 Census of Agriculture, available at http://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/ and U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/. See also
Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements
for Agriculture, tbl. 1 Colorado Dept. of Agriculture (1995).
53. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1779, 41 ELR 20168
(2011); Cleaver v. Judd, 393 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Or. 1964); Bower v. Big
Horn Canal Assoc., 307 P.2d 593, 601 (Wyo. 1957).
54. See Mark Squillace, Accounting for Water Rights in the Western United States,
in International Water Accounting: Effective Management of a
Scarce Resource (2012).
55. Id.
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an appropriator might change crops and thereby consume
more water in a manner detrimental to an existing user,
will not generally trigger a valid legal claim by an injured
water user. Likewise, an existing user may recapture, reuse,
and thereby consume more water than was historically
consumed, to the detriment of other users, without giving
rise to a valid cause of action.56 Tolerating such vagaries in
the priority system is probably sensible and perhaps even
necessary to the efficient operation of the system, but it
also illustrates how a water right is not the inviolable form
of property that some wish to claim for it.
These examples highlight the inconsistent way that
water transfers are treated under the law. The smallest injuries could result in the denial of a transfer application, but
farmers need no approval to change to crops that could
cause far greater injuries to existing users.
Allowing parties to transfer consumptive use amounts,
without regard to the relatively minor injuries that such
transfers might cause, would help address the definitional
problem with water rights that exists under the current system, and could easily be accomplished in accordance with
property rights principles. The courts have consistently
recognized the power of government agencies to impose
modest constraints on the use of property without having
to compensate the property owner for any possible loss of
value.57 The ability of government agencies to impose such
limits on the use of private water rights should be especially
clear in the context of a resource where the property owner
has only a use right and where the corpus of the right is
held by the state in trust for the people.58
The difficulties inherent in transferring water in the
West have the unfortunate effect of increasing the price of
the limited supplies of water that are readily available for
transfer. This can be seen from the ease with which CBT
units are traded and the extraordinarily high price that
these units command in the marketplace.59 From 20072009, there were 353 permanent transfers in the western
United States.60 Of those transfers, 61% or 216 transfers
involved CBT units in Colorado.61 Put another way, more
than 60% of all transfer activity involved a single project
that represents a tiny fraction of total allocated water rights
in the western states. Prices for CBT units purchased in
Colorado from 2007-2009 were also among the highest
56. See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996); Binning v. Miller, 102 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1940); Department of Ecology v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 827 P.2d 275 (Wash. 1992).
57. See, e.g., supra note 7.
58. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. XVI, §5; Idaho Const. art. XV, §1, Cal.
Const. art. X, §5; Wyo. Const. art. I, §31.
59. See Booker et al., supra note 6, at 208 (“Gardner and Miller [1983] . . .
found that while most CBT shares at the time were held by agricultural
users, prices fully reflected expected values to future municipal and industrial buyers.”).
60. There were 135 permanent transfers in the West in 2007. Eighty-seven of
these involved CBT units. 2007 Annual Transaction Review, Water Strategist, Feb. 2008, at 11-15. In 2008, there were 116 permanent transfers; 69
involved CBT units. 2008 Annual Transaction Review, Water Strategist,
Feb. 2009, at 8-12. In 2009, there were 102 permanent transfers in the
western states; 60 involved CBT units. 2009 Annual Transaction Review,
Water Strategist, Feb. 2010, at 9-13.
61. Id.
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recorded for permanent transfers in western states.62 The
relative paucity of these transfers calls into question the
adequacy of the public’s information about the true price
of water.
If the only consequence of the market failure in water
resources was that municipal residents were forced to pay
a higher price for their water, this might be considered an
acceptable outcome. But the consequences are far more
serious, especially in terms of environmental impacts.
When a city decides that it needs to secure additional water
resources, it has several options. First, and perhaps most
importantly, it can embark on a water conservation program to reduce per capita consumption.63 Second, it can
purchase senior water rights (or farmlands that include
senior water rights) and begin the process of transferring
that water to municipal use.64 As previously noted, this
can be a long and expensive process with an uncertain
outcome. Third, it can look to developing new sources of
water, either from groundwater or water storage projects.65
Groundwater is not always available and may not be a

62. In 2007, CBT units were purchased from $9,215-$10,500/unit ($11,519$13,125/AF) on average. 2007 Annual Transaction Review, supra note 60,
at 18. These prices were significantly higher than recorded prices for permanent transfers in most western states. Id. at 11-15. Examples of prices
in other western states include purchases of pumping rights to Edwards
Aquifer in Texas for $5,000/AF and non-irrigation water rights in Arizona
for $1,200-$2,000/AF. Id. at 11, 15. In 2008, average CBT prices ranged
from $9,215-$9,716/unit ($13,164-$13,880/AF), excluding certain November transactions because their price was negotiated in 2002. 2008 Annual Transaction Report, supra note 60, at 16. In Texas, pumping rights for
the Edwards Aquifer again sold for $5,000/AF and non-irrigation water
rights in Arizona sold for $1,200-$2,000/AF. Id. at 16. Prices ranged from
$1,800-$3,650/AF in California in the Mojave River Basin. Id. CBT units
in 2009 sold for $7,133-$10,000/unit ($8,916-$12,500/AF) on average.
2009 Annual Transaction Review, supra note 60, at 16. In Texas, rights to
the Edwards Aquifer sold for $5,400-$6,500/AF. Id. at 16. Non-irrigation
rights in Arizona sold for $1,000-$2,000/AF. Id. Prices in the Mojave River
Basin of California ranged from $400-$3,841. Id. CBT units are converted
to acre-feet using a quota set each year by the NCWCD. The quota was
80% in 2007 and 2009, and 70% in 2008. See News Releases & Policies,
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, available at http://www.
ncwcd.org/news_information/news_release.asp. In setting the initial quota
each October and resetting the following April, the Board takes into account water availability and need in the region. Since CBT water is designed
as a supplemental water supply, the Board looks at native water supplies and
local storage during the quota setting process. See Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District, Water Conservation and Management Plan, 3 (2004)
[hereinafter NCWCD Management Plan], available at http://www.ncwcd.
org/ncwcd_about/pdf/cons_plan.pdf.
63. See Kenney, supra note 8, at 15-20, comparing costs of conservation programs, water transfers, and water development projects. Study finds that
conservation is the cheapest option. Id. at 21.
64. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text. See also Kenney, supra note 8,
at 11-12 (assessing the relative costs of water transfers to other water
supply options).
65. Both groundwater and storage projects have found little success in the past
20 years. See generally Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 427-28. American
Water Development, Inc., was defeated in its attempt to tap and export
200,000 acre-feet of groundwater from beneath land it owned in the San
Luis Valley as it was determined to be tributary groundwater. American
Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 358 (Colo. 1994). Additionally, new development of water storage projects is considered by most
commentators to be nearly impossible because of environmental and areaof-origin considerations. See, e.g., Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 447
(claiming that any new development will be small-scale and “unconventional” reservoirs).
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secure, long-term resource.66 Moreover, much groundwater
is hydrologically connected to surface water, and thus often
leads to conflicts with senior surface water users.67
Water storage, often with water from remote water
basins, has historically proved to be a reliable source for
new water resources, but it can also be very expensive. To
justify construction of new projects, a city typically compares the cost of building and operating the project to other
options, including the costs associated with buying, transferring, and delivering water from existing users. If the cost
of transferring water is inflated well beyond the true market price, water development looks far more reasonable.68
Suppose, for example, that a city decides it needs to
secure an additional 10,000 acre-feet of water to satisfy
its projected demands. If the price for water in a dysfunctional market is currently $10,000/acre-foot (including
delivery costs) then, assuming that operation and maintenance costs are comparable, the city will likely opt to
transfer water rights only if the cost of a project to produce
that water is more than $100 million—the cost of purchasing and transferring 10,000 acre-feet of water rights.
If the true market price for water, however, is $1,000 per
acre-foot, then a city would be justified in pursuing the
project only if the project could be built for less than $10
million.69 Perhaps more importantly, if the city is not sure
how much water it will get from the proposed transfer, or
how long it will take to consummate the transfer, the city
might reasonably opt to build the project, even if it is pro66. Although most groundwater aquifers do have a certain level of recharge
or replenishment, the rate is significantly slow, and therefore, groundwater resources are usually considered nonrenewable. See, e.g., World Bank,
Sustainable Groundwater Management: Concepts and Tools, Briefing Note
11, 1 (2002), available at cap-net.org/sites/cap-net.org/files/wtr_mngmnt_
tls/38_GWMate11.pdf; see also Peter D. Nichols et al., Water and
Growth in Colorado: A Review of Legal and Policy Issues 99, 103
(2001) (explaining that in Colorado, tributary groundwater is treated like
surface waters under the prior appropriation system and that non-tributary
groundwater can only be permanent source of water supply if withdrawals
are limited to the recharge rate).
67. See, e.g., American Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 357,
359, 368 (Colo. 1994); Kobobel v. State, Dept. of Natural Resources, 249
P.3d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 2011); Three Bells Ranch Associates v. Cache La
Poudre Water Users Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164, 169-70 (Colo. 1988).
68. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 4, at 421-22:
[M]unicipalities such as Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Pueblo West,
and Aurora now own almost all of the water from the Twin Lakes
project located south of Leadville, a trans-basin project originally
designed to serve irrigation interests. Shares sell for $10,000 to
$15,000, a price dramatically higher than the cost of native Arkansas River water. Yet, buying shares of trans-basin water for municipal use makes better economic sense than buying native water
since it is generally possible to unilaterally change the use without
the uncertainty or risk of water court. CBT shares exhibit a similar trend. Municipal water providers concerned about water court
costs to convert native water dramatically bid up the price of CBT
units. Weighted CBT prices rose steadily from around $3,600 per
acre-foot in June 1996 to nearly $26,000 per acre-foot in April
2000. In contrast, competing native irrigation water sells for $500
to $1,000 per acre-foot, depending on location.
69. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, Northern Integrated Supply Project DEIS, ES-6 (Apr. 2008), available at https://www.nwo.
usace.army.mil/html/od-tl/eis/nisp.deis.apr08.pdf. No-action alternative,
which would involve acquiring the water from CBT, would cost an estimated $830,500,000. This is significantly more than the other proposed
alternatives, all of which involve major water development projects.
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jected to cost more to ensure that needed water resources
are secured.
While water transfers can have adverse environmental
impacts,70 limiting transfers to the existing consumptive
use, i.e., the amount that has historically been consumed
by the existing user, and restricting transfers to the basin
of origin, would largely guarantee that such environmental impacts would be relatively modest. By contrast, water
development projects, especially those that draw water
from remote water basins, are far more likely to impose
serious environmental damage.71 These damages may be
justified by the costs and benefits associated with the projects as compared to the alternatives. But when the water
transfer alternative is based upon the significantly inflated
costs of a dysfunctional market, environmentalists and
economic conservatives alike can fairly question whether
a more rational approach to water transfers should be fashioned. Suggestions for reforming current law and practices
to overcome the problems identified in this section are set
out in a later section of this Article. And, as already noted,
relatively minor changes to existing law could correct some
of the most troubling flaws in the current system and help
to promote a truly free and flourishing water market.
One additional but important advantage of defining
water rights in terms of consumptive use is the fundamental way that it changes incentives for farmers. Under
current law, a farmer’s incentive is to grow the most waterconsumptive crop possible, especially if that farmer is even
remotely contemplating a possible future transfer of the
water right. This is because the transfer amount will likely
be limited to the amount of water historically consumed.72
If however, a water right is defined in terms of its consumptive use, the farmer has the opposite incentive.
Consider, for example, a farmer who has historically
grown alfalfa on 100 acres of land. That farmer would
typically consume about193 acre-feet of water in northeastern Colorado.73 If the law defined that farmer’s water
right as the full 193 acre-feet of water consumed by the
alfalfa crop, that farmer would have a powerful incentive to
switch to a less water-intensive crop, so as to be able to sell
the remaining right. Growing sunflowers, for example, in
northeastern Colorado would consume about 134 acre-feet
of water.74 Thus, the farmer could continue to farm, albeit
with a different crop, while at the same time realizing a
70. See, e.g., Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers:
Implications for Water Management, 35 Nat. Resources J. 1, 13 (1995)
(explaining environmental impacts of California’s water banks).
71. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, Moffat Collection
System Project (Moffat Project) Draft EIS (Oct. 2009), available at http://
www.nwo.usace.army.mil/html/od-tl/eis/moffat-deis-docs.html; U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service comment to RWSP EIS Public Scoping Summary
Report, available at http://www.nwo.usace.army.mil/html/od-tl/eis/rwsp.
scoping.comment.2009.fed.pdf; Northern Integrated Supply Project DEIS,
supra note 69.
72. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. §41-3-104(a) (2010); see also Orr v. Arapahoe, 753 P.2d
1217, 1224 (Colo. 1988).
73. A Review of the Likely Agricultural Impacts From the Northern Integrated Supply Project, n.7. See also Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements for Agriculture tbl. 1, Colorado Dept. of Agriculture
(1995).
74. Id.
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significant profit from selling the water saved as a result of
the crop switch.

IV.

Water Transfers That Work

The possibilities for and obstacles to water transfers can
best be understood by reviewing the circumstances that
have facilitated transfers in the past. For several reasons,
the opportunities for simple and efficient transfers are particularly good for the many water districts and mutual
ditch companies that operate throughout the western
United States. First, the water rights for many of these
entities were approved for a wide range of uses over a relatively large geographic area. Thus, a “transfer” of water
within the district from one approved use to another does
not generally require a formal application or approval process. Second, a substantial portion of the water rights for
these entities are associated with storage reservoirs, which
greatly increases management flexibility. Once water is
stored, it is free from the “call of the river,”75 and it can
be quickly and easily sold within the project area for any
of the uses for which is was originally approved. Finally,
many of these entities have elaborate delivery systems that
allow the water to be distributed over a large portion of
the project area with only modest infrastructure improvements. Existing projects involving permanent and temporary transfers in the West offer a window into developing
more robust water markets.

A.

Permanent Transfers

The CBT project may be the most studied water project
anywhere in the world, in part because of its remarkable
success in achieving a robust market for its water resources.76 In 1929, the Colorado State Engineer, the Platte Valley Water Conservation League, and the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers sponsored a study that found that the water
resources in the South Platte Basin were insufficient to
75. A call of the river allows senior water rights holders to require junior water
rights holders upstream to curtail use if senior rights holders are not receiving their entitled portion due to low stream flow. See Charles W. Howe,
Water Law and Economics: An Assessment of River Calls and the South Platte
Well Shut-Down, 12 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 181, 181-82 (2008).
76. See, e.g., Daniel Tyler, The Last Water Hole in the West: The Colorado-Big
Thompson Project and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
(1992); David S. Brookshire et al., Market Prices for Water in the Semiarid
West of the United States, Water Resources Res. 40 (2004); Janis M. Carey
& David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects. 41 Nat.
Res. J. 283 (2001); Raymond L. Anderson, Windfall Gains From Transfers of
Water Allotments Within the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 43 Land Econ.
265 (1989); Charles W. Howe, Project Benefits and Costs From National and
Regional Viewpoints: Methodological Issues and Case Study of the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, 27 Nat. Resources J. 5 (1987); Market Activity in Southwestern States, in Saliba & Bush, supra note 40, at 116-21 (1987); Charles
W. Howe et al., Innovations in Water Management: Lessons From the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
in Scarce Water and Institutional Change, 171-200 (1986); Charles
W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for
Water Markets, Water Resources Res. 22 (4), 439-45 (1986); Water Organizations: The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, in Hartman
& Seastone, supra note 6; J.M. Dille, A Brief History of Northern
Colorado and the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (1958).
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meet the current and future supply demands for northeastern Colorado.77 However, the study identified a potential
surplus of water on the western side of the Continental
Divide, within the headwaters of the Colorado River.78 The
U.S. Department of the Interior Appropriation Act of 1937
approved construction of the transmountain water diversion and supply project, known as the CBT.79
Approval of the project was contingent upon the formation of a public water district in Colorado to contract with
the U.S. government for repayment of the project costs.80
The Colorado Water Conservancy Act81 authorized a district court to organize a conservancy district upon petition
of a stipulated number of property owners.82 Landowners subsequently created the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District (NCWCD) and designated it as
a public agency authorized to contract with the United
States for the development and management of the CBT
system and its water supply.83 According to the NCWCD
Water Conservation and Management Plan, “[t]he District’s primary purpose is to provide supplemental water
for agricultural, municipal, domestic, and industrial uses
in northeastern Colorado.”84
What makes this project so important for the study of
water transfers is that the 310,000 CBT shares that represent water rights are freely marketable over the entire
District—a vast geographic area that includes all of the
urban areas along the Front Range of Colorado from
Broomfield to Fort Collins.85 The project also includes a
large collection and distribution system that encompasses
12 reservoirs, 35 miles of tunnels, and 95 miles of canals.86
A series of pumps move water up from Lake Granby to
Shadow Mountain Reservoir, which then flows into Grand
Lake, all on the western slope of Colorado.87 From there,
the 13.1-mile-long Alva B. Adams Tunnel carries Colorado River water under the Continental Divide to tunnels,
77. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Project Details—Colorado-Big Thompson Project—Development—History 9, available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects/
Project.jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project.
78. Id.
79. Robert Autobee, Colorado-Big Thompson Project, Bureau of Reclamation
History Program, Research on Historic Reclamation Projects 3, 10,(1996),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects//ImageServer?imgName=Doc_
1303159857902.pdf.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§37-45-101 et seq. (2010).
82. Id. §§108-09.
83. Id.; see also NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62.
84. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62, at 3 (“The water is used to
alleviate the critical shortages that have hampered and restricted the cultivation of fertile lands in the South Platte River Valley.”); see U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, Project Details—Colorado-Big Thompson Project—Benefits—
Municipal and Industrial, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_
Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project (11 communities now receive full
or supplemental use from the project); see also Autobee, supra note 79, at 12
(“[The project] provide[s] water to existing farmlands and was not designed
to reclaim uncultivated land.”).
85. The NCWCD serves a population of approximately 750,000 and delivers
an average of 220,000 acre-feet per year to more than 100 ditch, reservoir,
and irrigation companies, and 32 municipalities. For a description of the
geographic area encompassed by the District, see NCWCD Management
Plan, supra note 62, at 3.
86. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Colorado-Big Thompson
Project, http://www.ncwcd.org/project_features/cbt_main.asp.
87. Id.
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canals, and pipelines that divert and disperse the water to
users throughout northeastern Colorado.88 A number of
reservoirs store the CBT flows on the eastern slope, and
the system forks to the north and south, tying distribution into South Platte River tributaries from the Cache la
Poudre River to Boulder Creek.89 The CBT system has a
total storage capacity of 925,456 acre-feet, with the majority of its western slope capacity held within Lake Granby
(539,758 acre-feet), and the Front Range capacity primarily
coming from Horsetooth Reservoir (156,735 acre-feet) and
Carter Lake (112,230 acre-feet).90 With 75,000 acre-feet of
dead storage, Lake Granby can hold over two years of CBT
water in active storage.91
A hallmark of the CBT project is the ease with which
shares are bought and sold and the variety of uses for which
they are approved. Transactions occur wholly within the
NCWCD, so approval by the Colorado water court is not
required.92 CBT transfers are relatively straightforward,
inexpensive, and require little time (two-three months) in
comparison to typical water transfers.93 Therefore, it is easy
to acquire CBT rights quickly.94 The CBT project illustrates generally the enormous value of a free and open market for water. If water rights can be defined not merely as
an amount available for withdrawal, but also in terms of
the amount of water consumed by the current use, and if
that consumptive use can be converted to a presumptively
marketable quantity of water, then the prospect exists for a
truly open and robust water market that has the potential
to reduce the price of water and make water shortages a
thing of the past.
A less obvious but additional lesson that can be gleaned
from the CBT experience is the importance of access by
water buyers and sellers to the elaborate distribution systems that typically characterize publicly financed water
projects. Municipal and industrial usage has gradually
increased since 1958, and 66% of CBT units are now
owned by municipal and industrial users.95 However,
approximately 60% of the actual deliveries are still used by
88. Id.
89. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Project Details—Colorado Big-Thompson Project—Facility Descriptions, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project (last visited July 26,
2012).
90. Northern Colorado Water Conservation District, Colorado-Big Thompson
Project: Interpretive Area, available at http://www.ncwcd.org/news_information/web_news/Publications/Interpretive%20area.pdf.
91. See U.S. Geological Survey, 09018500 LAKE GRANBY NEAR GRANBY,
CO, http://pubs.usgs.gov/wdr/wdr-co-03-1/vol2/html/09018500.2003.sw.
html; see also Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in
Berthoud, Colo. (July 17, 2009) (“Dead Storage” is defined as water storage
space below the level of the spillway.).
92. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62.
93. W.L. Nieuwoudt, Water Market Institutions in Colorado With Possible Lessons
for South Africa, 26 Water SA 27, 30 (2000).
94. Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in Berthoud,
Colo. (July 17, 2009). In December 2008, CBT units sold at a price of
$9,300/unit, when the quota set at that time yielded 0.6 acre-feet per unit,
Transactions: Colorado, 23 Water Strategist 1, Jan. 2009. From 2002 to
2008, CBT unit prices have fluctuated between approximately $9,30010,600/unit, Water Market Indicators: Colorado-Big Thompson Units, 23
Water Strategist 11, 12 Nov., Dec. 2009.
95. Telephone Interview with Sherri Rasmussen, Allotment Contract Specialist,
N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. (July 6, 2012).

Copyright © 2012 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

9-2012

NEWS & ANALYSIS

agriculture,96 which lease water from municipal shareholders, especially during the drier months of the later summer.97 As noted above, the NCWCD has built an elaborate
distribution system that could potentially facilitate transfers of non-NCWCD water if others had fair access to the
NCWCD system. California requires water utilities to provide access to other water distributors when the utility has
excess capacity,98 and such legislation should be encouraged throughout the West.
Despite the success of the CBT market, the high price
paid for CBT water points to the failure of water markets.
CBT water represents only a small fraction of the water
used in northeastern Colorado,99 and the limited supply
of this easily transferable water resource has pushed up its
price. The policies of the NCWCD have also contributed
to the supply problem by limiting municipal purchases to
80% of CBT shares.100 If other water resources within the
CBT service area were more easily bought and sold, and
if access to the NCWCD’s distribution system was more
readily available at a fair price to other water buyers and
sellers, one could imagine a far more robust market with
the ability to buy and sell water at much lower prices.

B.

Temporary Transfers

Temporary water transfers or water-leasing programs also
hold promise for moving more water to urban communities while protecting rural areas that may otherwise face
the prospect of losing water rights permanently. In particular, excellent opportunities exist to support rotational
fallowing programs, water banking, and interruptible supply agreements, or “dry year options.”101 The advantage
96. NCWCD Delivery Database, CBT Project Deliveries (June 16, 2009) (on
file with author).
97. See NCWCD Carryover Capacity Transferability Program, Rules 3 (Aug.
2004), available at http://www.ncwcd.org/news_information/web_news/
LatestNews/CCTP.pdf.
98. Cal. Water Code §§1810-1814 (2011); While these water wheeling statutes are helpful, they have been criticized recently for inadequately defining
(1) what “unused capacity” means and how it is determined under the statute, (2) what “fair compensation” is, and (3) the rights of parties attempting
to wheel water of a substantially different quality than the agency’s water. See
Gray, supra note 23, at 33.
99. CBT water use accounts for approximately 260,000 acre-feet annually, while
groundwater use alone in northeastern Colorado is estimated at 880,000
acre-feet. See United States Bureau of Reclamation, Project Details—Colorado-Big Thompson Project—Plan, available at http://www.usbr.gov/projects/
Project.jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project; see also Colorado Dept. of Natural Resources, Interim Water Supply and Needs Report
for the South Platte Basin and Denver/South Metro Counties, available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/basin-roundtables/Documents/
SouthPlatte/MetroSPInterimBasinWaterSupplyNeedsReport.pdf.
100. Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in Berthoud,
Colo. (July 17, 2009).
101. Rotational fallowing programs give farmers the option to fallow a portion of
their land. The unused water from the fallowed land can then be leased to
municipalities. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Alternative Agricultural Transfer Methods Grant Program Study 5 (May 2011), available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply-planning/
Pages/main.aspx. Interruptible water supply agreements or dry year options
allow municipalities to contract with farmers for water during dry years,
thereby allowing municipalities to avoid more costly permanent water supply agreements. See generally Michael O’Donnell, & Bonnie Colby, DryYear Water Supply Reliability Contracts: A Tool for Water Managers, Univ. of
Arizona Dept. of Agricultural and Resource Economics (Oct. 2009), avail-

42 ELR 10809

of these programs is that they allow agricultural sellers to
retain ownership and control over water rights, even as the
water is made available for municipal use.102
The rotational fallowing program that was pioneered
by the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) of southern
California in its agreement with the Metropolitan Water
District (MWD) offers a particularly useful model for
studying temporary transfers. In 1991, the MWD initiated a two-year pilot program with the PVID to reduce
the area’s use of the Colorado River while promoting a sustainable rural economy.103 Under the test program, 20,215
acres were voluntarily fallowed by farmers for annual payments of $620 per acre. The payments totaled $25 million over the two-year period, with approximately 93,000
acre-feet of water stored in Lake Mead and made available
to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. While the region suffered a modest job loss of 1.3%, property and sales taxes
were not affected. The success of the pilot program led to
a more permanent arrangement. Farmers must make a
long-term commitment to the program, but they are paid
for each acre of land fallowed.104 Currently, PVID growers fallow between 7% and 35% of their land annually,105
providing between 25,000 and 111,000 acre-feet of water
to the MWD each year, which uses existing infrastructure
to deliver the water to urban customers.106
The success of the MWD/PVID program stirred
interest among several mutual ditch companies in the
Lower Arkansas River Basin of Colorado.107 In November 2002, voters in the Arkansas Valley agreed to form
the Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District
(LAVWCD).108 Although most conservancy districts are
organized to develop water resources, the LAVWCD’s
mission is to ensure the continued availability of water
resources and the long-term economic viability of the

able at http://ag.arizona.edu/arec/pubs/facultypubs/ewsr-dyo-Final-5-12-10.
pdf. Water banking involves the selling of stored water or storage capacity
to parties interested in purchasing that water, often for use at a more convenient time and place. Analysis of Water Banks in the Western States, Washington Dept. of Ecology (2004) [hereinafter Analysis of Water Banks], available
at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0411011.pdf. This excellent report offers a
detailed discussion of the various approaches to water banking, along with a
comprehensive survey of water banks in the western United States.
102. The Super Ditch Company’s Articles of Incorporation provide that its irrigators can participate in water banking, interruptible supply agreements, and
water banking. See Articles of Incorporation of the Lower Arkansas Super
Ditch Company ¶ 3.2(a) (May 7, 2008) [hereinafter Articles of Incorporation], §2.1.
103. Field Hearing at LaQuinta, California, on the Implementation of the California Plan for the Colorado River—Opportunities and Challenges Before
the Subcommittee on Water and Power of the House Resources Committee
on Natural Resources, 107th Cong. 1-2 (2002) (Addendum to the testimony of Phillip J. Pace, Chairman, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.).
104. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Dep’t of Natural Res., The Statewide Water Supply Initiative: Phase 2 (SWSI) 3-22 (2007) [hereinafter
SWSI 2007].
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Jay Winner & Mary Lou Smith, Colorado’s “Super Ditch”: Can Farmers Cooperate to Make Lemonade Out of Lemons?, Report to the U.S. Committee
on Irrigation and Drainage 6 (Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Winner].
108. See The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation Dist. History, http://
www.lavwcd.org/history.html.
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Lower Arkansas Valley.109 The District hired an engineering firm to conduct a feasibility study on a water-leasing
program in the Arkansas Basin.110 The study made preliminary estimates of the quantity of water available for
leasing and identified potential ditch companies to participate in the program.111 The seven ditch companies that fit
the qualities necessary for the program included Bessemer
Ditch, Rocky Ford Highline Canal, Oxford Farmers Ditch,
Otero Canal, Catlin Canal, Holbrook Canal, Fort Lyon
Storage Canal, and Fort Lyon Canal.112 The still evolving
proposal in the Lower Arkansas Valley, often described as
the “Super Ditch,” highlights the potential complexity of
a temporary transfer program. The Super Ditch proposal
is essentially a Super Ditch Company established by the
LAVWCD to facilitate the pooling of the water resources
of these seven ditch companies and the leasing of these
pooled resources to municipal water suppliers, primarily
through a system of rotational fallowing.113
The MWD/PVID program, however, has a distinct
advantage over the Super Ditch proposal, because it pairs
a single owner (PVID) of significant senior water rights
with the needs of a single large water consumer.114 By
contrast, the fallowing program proposed by the Super
Ditch Company would involve seven ditch companies
and a multitude of water rights, supplying water to as
yet unknown municipalities.115 This would allow the
LAVWCD to create an open market to lease water to
anyone with needs in the Basin, but it requires the seller
to aggregate multiple water rights, possibly with multiple
buyers, thereby greatly increasing the complexity of the
transfers and other terms of any agreement among the
relevant parties.116 This is of particular concern, given the
problem of high transaction costs that have long been
associated with water transfers.117
Given the complicated nature of the Super Ditch proposal, it is unsurprising that the LAVWCD has encoun109. See The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation Dist., Mission, http://
www.lavwcd.org/mission.html. (The LAVWCD’s Mission Statement declares that its purpose is:
To acquire, retain and conserve water flowing in the Arkansas River
and its tributaries; to insure that all water will remain in the Valley for the socio-economic benefit of the District citizens; and to
participate in water-related projects that will embody thoughtful
conservation, responsible growth, and beneficial water usage within
the Lower Arkansas Valley. To further its mission, the District may,
among other methods, accept conservation easements, with or
without water attached, that will further the mission of the District
and its interests.
110. Id. at 5; see also HDR Engineering, Inc., Lower Arkansas Valley Water
Leasing Potential Preliminary Feasibility Investigation, Report to
Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation District (2006) [hereinafter HDR Engineering].
111. Id. HDR Engineering, The study analyzed natural stream flow data from
1956 through 2004.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Alternative Agricultural Transfer Methods Grant Program Study
5, supra note 101.
114. Winner, supra note 107, at 6; Telephone Interview with Jay Winner, Executive Director of the LAVWCD, in Boulder, Colo. (Aug. 13, 2009).
115. Id.
116. HDR Engineering, supra note 110, at 84-85.
117. For a discussion of transaction costs, see notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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tered a variety of legal, logistical, and political difficulties.118 Among these was persuading irrigators to participate before the basic details of the program, including the
price per acre-foot of water and the length of leases, were
decided.119 For now, interested parties have simply been
asked to pledge a willingness to participate contingent
upon the final details.120
The legal problems are potentially even more daunting.
Most importantly, the Company will have to seek judicial
approval for each of its leases prior to changing the point
of diversion and new use of the water right. For purposes
of transferring water rights, Colorado law historically does
not differentiate between temporary or long-term transfers
or between leases and permanent transfers.121 The process
for gaining water court approval will significantly increase
transaction costs and could compromise the success of the
Super Ditch proposal.
Assuming these complications can be addressed to the
satisfaction of the parties, opportunities for rotational fallowing, as well as water banking and interruptible supply
agreements, or “dry year options,” do hold promise.122
Rotational fallowing seems to be driving the Super Ditch
proposal, perhaps because it is viewed as offering the greatest potential for amassing a substantial amount of water
that could be made available on a relatively permanent
basis. However, the opportunities for banking and dry year
options should not be overlooked.
Water banking in particular could hold promise, given
the substantial storage capacity in the Arkansas Basin.123
One could imagine, for example, an arrangement comparable to that between Arizona and the Southern Nevada
118. For example, historically, the ditch companies involved in the Super Ditch
Company have had trouble working together. HDR Engineering, supra
note 110, at 109. There are logistical hurdles in determining how shares in
the company will be distributed to irrigators because different ditches have
different yields and quality of water. See Articles of Incorporation, supra
note 102, at 3.2(b) (describing that the amount of shares disbursed will vary
depending on the particular ditch and its historic yield and water quality).
Additionally, some of the ditch companies’ bylaws do not allow the ditch’s
water to be used on lands not served by the ditch. See Winner, supra note
107, at 7.
119. Chris Woodka, Roundtable Supports Study of Super Ditch, The Pueblo
Chieftain (Sept. 13, 2007).
120. Winner, supra note 107, at 7. Additionally, the LAVWCD had to address
the practice among ditch companies of including in their bylaws clauses
restricting the use of water to lands served directly by the ditch.
121. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-304(3.5). See also Fort Lyon Canal Co. v.
Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 506 (Colo. 1982).
122. The Super Ditch Company’s Articles of Incorporation provide that its irrigators can participate in water banking, interruptible supply agreements, and
water banking. See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 102, §2.1.
123. The Colorado Water Conservation Board has listed the major storage facilities or projects in the Arkansas River Basin as: John Martin Reservoir
(618,600 acre-feet); Pueblo Reservoir (357,678 acre-feet); Great Plains Reservoir (265,552 acre-feet); Twin Lakes (141,000 acre-feet); Turquoise Reservoir (129,440 acre-feet); Trinidad Reservoir (119,887 acre-feet); Adobe
Creek Reservoir (71,000 acre-feet); Cuchara Valley Reservoir (40,960 acrefeet); Lake Meredith (39,804 acre-feet); Horse Creek Reservoir (28,000
acre-feet); Mt. Elbert Forebay (11,530 acre-feet); Clear Creek Reservoir
(11,500 acre-feet); Lake Henry (9,500 acre-feet); St. Charles Reservoir No.
3 (8.638 acre-feet); Dye Reservoir (5,640 acre-feet); Holbrook Reservoir
(4,500 acre-feet); Brush Hollow Reservoir (3,933 acre-feet); Mt. Pisgah
Reservoir (2,471 acre-feet); and Deweese-Dye Reservoir (1,772 acre-feet).
Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Dep’t of Natural Res., The Statewide Supply Initiative: Fact Sheet for the Arkansas Basin 1 (2006).
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Water Authority (SNWA) whereby the SNWA sends surplus water to Arizona for storage and later use in Arizona.
In exchange, the SNWA receives credits that will allow
it to withdraw an equivalent amount of water from Lake
Mead.124 Similarly, a southern Front Range city could allow
its surplus water supplies to pass by its diversion point for
storage in an Arkansas Basin reservoir, where it could be
made available for downstream users. The city would then
have the opportunity to use that water in a dry year when
it needs additional supplies.
Dry year options could also be constructed creatively to
allow cities to take a fixed amount of agricultural water in
dry years, either from a willing individual user or perhaps
from an entire ditch company that might be willing to
forego a certain percentage of its supply in a dry year. The
remaining water could be allocated proportionally among
mutual shareholders, or farmers could opt for more or less
water with the payment of appropriate fees.

V.

Reforming Water Transfer Law

While it can be argued persuasively that the basic structure
of prior appropriation law requires reform,125 fundamental
changes to that law are neither politically tenable nor necessary to address the most pressing problems facing water
resources management in the West. But modest reforms
and new ways of thinking about western water law are necessary if the West is going to meet the challenges posed
by growing urban demand for water. Set forth below are
several recommendations that could, if implemented, provide water resources to meet the future water needs of the
western United States.

A.

Define Water Rights by Consumptive Use and
Allow Presumptive Transfers of the Consumptive
Use Amount

Western water rights have historically been defined in
terms of the amount of water diverted for a particular use
on a particular tract of land. The amount of water consumed can vary, so long as the location and type of use
does not change. Under current state water law, consump124. See The Storage and Interstate Release Agreement among the Secretary of
the Interior; the Arizona Water Banking Authority; the Southern Nevada
Water Authority; and the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, Contract
No. 02-XX-30-W0406 (June 12, 2001), available at http://www.usbr.gov/
lc/region/g4000/SIRA/finagmt.pdf; see also Patricia Mulroy, Beyond the Division: A Compact That Unites, 28 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 105, 109
(2008).
125. Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 Colo. L. Rev.
317, 344 (1985); Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian:
Land, Water, and the Future of the West 21-22 (1992); Charles F.
Wilkinson, Prior Appropriation 1848-1991, 21 Envtl. L. xxix (1991); Leila
C. Behnampour, Reforming a Western Water Institution: How Expanding the
Productivity of Water Rights Could Lessen Our Water Woes, 41 Envtl. L. 201,
204 (2011) (explaining that the prior appropriation doctrine hinders water conservation); Mark Honhart, Carrots for Conservation: Oregon’s Water
Conservation Statute Offers Incentives to Invest in Efficiency, 66 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 827, 828 (1995) (describing how the prior appropriation doctrine has
become an obstacle to dealing with the problem of inefficient water use in
the West).
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tive use becomes relevant only when a water user decides to
sell the water right. At that point, the amount available for
transfer will generally be limited to the amount of water
historically consumed.126 State water law further prohibits
the transfer of the consumptive amount of a water right
if such a transfer would cause even the tiniest injury.127
For opponents of a transfer, the no injury rule provides
an opportunity to drag out the transfer process for many
years at great expense to everyone involved. These high
transaction costs stand as one of the biggest disincentives
to water transfers.
As previously suggested, the absolute nature of the no
injury rule as applied to water transfers is entirely at odds
with the more flexible approaches in a raft of other areas
of water law, such as measuring the accuracy of the diversion amount or allowing water users to change to crops
that consume more water.128 A similar flexibility should be
embraced for water transfers, since water transfers may very
well hold the key to addressing the water scarcity issues
expected to arise in the future.129
Redefining western water rights in terms of both the
diversion amount and consumptive use amount would be
relatively simple and would not disrupt the historic operation of state water law. It would, of course, impose a modest administrative burden on the state, particularly during
the time that the state is establishing consumptive use
amounts for existing water rights. But if the state defined
all water rights within a basin in terms of both the diversion amount and consumptive use amount, the state would
be in the position to presumptively allow the transfer of
that consumptive use amount, at least within the same
water basin, subject to minimal procedure. The processes
for defining consumptive use rights and for allowing the
transfer of these rights require elaboration.
First, defining all water rights in a state in terms of both
the diversion amount and consumptive use will take time,
but it can be accomplished deliberately over a period of
years. This will allow states to gain experience carrying out
the task fairly and efficiently. States might begin with a
rulemaking process to help define terms, but should probably resist trying to do much with rules in favor of learning through case-by-case adjudication, at least until the
process is reasonably well-understood. In terms of actually
adjudicating consumptive use amounts, there are a number
of options. States could initially focus on the most waterstressed basins, and gradually work toward covering all
basins. Starting in the most water-stressed basins would
126. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §1725 (2011); Idaho Code §42-222 (2011);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §41-3-104(a) (West 2010).
127. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-305(3) (West 2011); Nev. Rev.
Stat. §533.370 (2010); Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 (West 2011); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. §41-3-104 (West 2010).
128. See Squillace, Accounting for Water Rights in the Western United States, supra
note 54.
129. The focus on precision in water transfers most likely reflects the suspicions
of early legislators about water transfers. By making it difficult to transfer
water, the law minimized the concerns that early water applicants were hoping to sell excess water that they might be able to acquire. See, e.g., Elwood
Mead, Irrigation Institutions 264 (1903).
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facilitate water transfers in the basins that would benefit
the most from them. Alternatively, a state might choose to
begin with a small basin that is not facing any particular
water shortage in order to obtain a better understanding
of possible challenges it might face when tackling a more
complex basin. A third, and perhaps the most practical
option, would be to begin with one or more water districts
or mutual ditch companies in a given basin, since these
entities generally hold large water rights that could be adjudicated more efficiently. Moreover, they might be in the
best position to pool a significant amount of water for sale
to a municipal supplier.130
The initial consumptive decisions should be made in
draft form by the appropriate state official, such as the State
Engineer, who could work in cooperation with a state agricultural school. Many of these schools have already done
the pioneering work in determining water consumption by
crops in different water basins.131 This work focuses on different types of basins throughout western states.132
Unlike traditional water rights, which are often defined
in terms of a flow right, consumptive use rights would
always be defined in terms of volume of water, probably
acre-feet. The owner of the water right and other interested
members of the public should be afforded an opportunity
to comment on the draft consumptive use decisions. States
could minimize the opportunities for objections by authorizing the state agency to treat crop and soil-types somewhat generically. This would allow states to cover large
tracts of land fairly quickly, especially where scientific data
is already available.
130. As suggested below, water supply organizations are probably in the best position to mimic the success of the CBT water market. They will be in a better position to do this if the law makes it easier to transfer consumptive use
amounts. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., José Luis Chávez et al., Remote Sensing ET of Alfalfa Using a Surface
Aerodynamic Temperature Model, 5th National Decennial Irrigation Conference Proceedings (2010); Bruce A. Lytle et al., A Win-Win Scenario for Urban-Rural Water Supplies, The Water Report, Feb. 2008, available at http://
www.lytlewater.com/waterreport0208.pdf. See also Save the Poudre Coalition, A Review of the Likely Agricultural Impacts From the Northern Integrated
Supply Project, app. A (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.savethepoudre.org/docs/stp_ag_impacts_analysis.pdf, citing the U.S. Department of
Agriculture 2002 Census of Agriculture, available at http://www.agcensus.
usda.gov/ and U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/. See also New Mexico
Water Use by Categories, 2005 (describing the Blaney-Criddle Method and
the Modified Blaney-Criddle Method for determining consumptive irrigation requirements), available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/Publications/Library/TechnicalReports/TechReport-052.pdf.
132. See, e.g., Ahmed E. Al-Juaidi, Water Allocation for Agricultural Use Considering Treated Wastewater, Public Health Risk, and Economic Issues, 33 Utah State
Univ. (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1250&context=etd&sei-redir=1#search=%22crops%20
water%20consumption%22 (Discussing Utah’s Bear River Valley Basin);
see also Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Alternative Agricultural Water
Transfer Methods Grant Program Summary, 8 tbl. 1 (2011); see, e.g., Timothy K. Gates et al., Toward Optimal Water Management in Colorado’s Lower
Arkansas River Valley, Colorado Water Resources Research Institute Completion Report No. 205 (2006), available at http://www.cwi.colostate.
edu/publications/cr/205.pdf; see, e.g., Amber Kirkpatrick et al., A Practical
Guide to Choosing Crops Well-Suited to Limited Irrigation, Irrigating With
Limited Water Supplies (2006), available at http://region8water.colostate.
edu/PDFs/Irrigating%20with%20Limited%20Water%20Supplies.pdf
(estimating water consumptive use of select crops in Montana, Colorado,
and Utah).
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Challenges to these consumptive use determinations
could be limited to: (1) whether the agency used the best
scientific information in making its judgment; (2) whether
a particular tract of land fits the soil profile used to make
the decision; and (3) whether the crop chosen to estimate
historic consumptive use accurately reflects that land’s
historical cropping pattern. Regarding this last point, the
legislation might place the burden on the agricultural user
of demonstrating to the appropriate state official the historic farming practices on the particular tract of land. The
legislation might also clarify the meaning of historic practices, perhaps by setting out the historic period subject to
review, and the number of years necessary to show historic
use for growing a particular crop. Alternatively, the appropriate state agency could adopt rules describing how it will
determine historic practices and other issues that might be
raised in the proceeding.
Once the consumptive use judgments are final, the
owners of those rights would be free to sell all or any portion of the consumptive use amount. It might be wise,
however, to build into the legislation a provision that subjects each transfer to a 10% reduction to protect stream
flows and to help account for any errors in the system. To
satisfy due process concerns, the proposed transfer should
still include a notification and decision process, but objectors should not be allowed to complain about the original consumptive use judgment that was made during the
basin review process.
While at first blush, farmers might be suspicious of
a streamlined water transfer process, it potentially offers
them a way to profit from their substantial agricultural
water rights while continuing to farm. Returning to an
earlier example, if a farmer in northeastern Colorado
receives a consumptive use declaration of 193 acre-feet
of water for 100 acres of land on which the farmer historically grew alfalfa,133 that farmer might be willing to
switch to a crop such as soybeans, which consumes only
122 acre-feet of water.134 This would allow the farmer
to sell the remaining 71 acre-feet, even while continuing to farm. The state would have to verify the change
in crop, and ensure that the farmer does not revert to a
more water-consumptive crop in the future. Eventually,
advances in satellite imaging technology should make
it possible to monitor the type of crop being grown by
farmers at a relatively low cost.135
133. Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements
for Agriculture tbl. 1, Colorado Dept. of Agriculture (1995) (figures for
Weld County), available at http://cospl.coalliance.org/fez/eserv/co:3072/
ag92ir71999internet.pdf.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., A Guide to the Practical Use of Aerial Color-Infrared Photography
in Agriculture Agricultural Applications of Color-Infrared Film, Univ. of Nebraska-Lincoln, Virtual Nebraska, Education Module, available at http://
www.casde.unl.edu/activities/cir-uses/applications/crop-inventory.php. See
also Ping Zhang et al., Potential Monitoring of Crop Production Using a
Satellite-Based Climate-Variability Impact Index, Agric. & Forest Meteorology 132 (2005), available at http://cybele.bu.edu/download/manuscripts/
zhping02.pdf (detailing the potential agricultural capabilities of different
types of imaging satellites and noting that currently, historical data and visual inspection are necessary to supplement satellite data.). See also Stephan
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Even greater savings might be realized if the farmer
were to limit an alfalfa crop to one or perhaps two cuttings each year, rather than the more typical three cuttings. Indeed, with climate change, Colorado farmers may
be in a position to take a fourth cutting, thereby consuming more water than they have historically consumed.
While many agricultural rights are defined as “seasonal,”
the length of the season is not typically specified in the
water rights decree.
A similar scenario could play out with a dry year option.
Our farmer could sell an option on 71 acre-feet for use by a
city during dry years, grow alfalfa in high water years, and
shift to a low water-consumption crop in dry years when
the city would receive the optioned water.
Importantly, none of this is possible under the current
legal regime. The farmer who shifts from alfalfa to soybeans receives no credit for the water saved, and pays no
penalty for shifting from soybeans to alfalfa, even if soybeans had been grown on the site for 100 years. While the
prospect of selling water sometime in the future may not be
the driving force behind decisions that farmers make about
the types of crops to grow, it is surely an important factor in any cropping decision. And the incentives under the
current system are all in favor of consuming more water.
The proposed reforms would give farmers the incentive to
consume less water and, in the process, potentially solve
water scarcity issues for many years to come.

B.

Demand Conservation and Reclamation Before
Agricultural to Urban Transfers Are Approved

Residents of rural areas are understandably unhappy about
the prospect of watching more of the water resources that
have historically supported their local economies transferred from agricultural to urban use. While a free market
in water could accelerate this trend, states can and should
provide rural communities with some assurance that
water transfers will not be approved unless and until the
buyer first demonstrates a clear need for additional water
resources, and takes responsibility for restoring the land
from which the water will be transferred to an appropriate
condition adequate to promote and sustain its value and
future uses.136
Municipal suppliers might demonstrate need by using
all reasonable conservation measures in the communities
they serve. “Reasonable conservation measures” could be
defined either by statute or regulation as measures that
bring per capita water use below a certain threshold, or
perhaps through more prescriptive standards, such as

J. Maas & Nithya Rajan, Agron. J. 100(2): 320-27, 327 (estimating ground
cover of field crops using medium-resolution multispectral satellite imagery. And observing that automation of satellite technology to monitor the
vegetation canopy and bare soil line could be possible in the future, but
currently has to be coupled with visual inspection).
136. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-305(4.5), which generally requires
“reasonable provisions designed to accomplish the revegetation and noxious
weed management of lands from which irrigation water is removed.”
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requiring that cities employ aggressive block-rate pricing
policies,137 or requiring that states recycle gray water.138
Restoration of the land might simply entail a commitment, backed by a bond, requiring the city to establish a
healthy, self-regenerating community of native grasses on
the dry lands, or it might involve some long-term commitment to engage in dry land farming139 or some other use
that will ensure that the land does not become a burden to
the host community.
While rural areas may continue to harbor some antipathy toward cities for their ever-increasing demands for
water, farmers are far more likely to accept water transfers
if they can see that the cities have made an aggressive commitment to conservation as a precondition to having agricultural water transfers approved, and if they are assured
that lands that are dried up as a result of an agricultural-tourban water transfer are restored to some productive use.

C.

Encourage Private and Public Agencies With
Substantial Storage Capacity and a Large Service
Area to Mimic the Success of the CBT Project

The CBT project is unique. Not only does it have the benefit of substantial storage in the system, it holds water rights
that are approved for a broad range of uses, operates an
elaborate delivery system in the most populous areas of the
northern Front Range of Colorado, and covers a substantial portion of the northeastern part of that state.140 Under
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the limited
supply of CBT shares attracts many buyers and sellers.
While it may be unlikely that other water organizations
will have all of the advantages of the CBT project, many
water entities will likely share some of the characteristics of
the CBT project, and some water entities could conceivably establish marketable shares, similar to CBT shares,
especially if states establish a system to facilitate the transfer of consumptive use amounts, as suggested above.141
Most ditch companies hold legal title to the water rights
used by their shareholders, but shares can be purchased by
cities for urban use.142 However, most ditch companies’
137. Douglas S. Kenney et al., Residential Demand Management: Lessons From
Aurora, Colorado, 44 J. Am. Water Res. Ass’n 192 (2008).
138. Yoram Cohen, Gray Water: A Potential Source of Water, Southern California
Environmental Report Card (Fall 2009), available at http://www.environment.ucla.edu/reportcard/article.asp?parentid=4870.
139. Randy Creswell & Franklin W. Martin, Dryland Farming: Crops
and Techniques for Arid Regions (1993, revised, 1998), available at
http://www.echonet.org/repositories/download/30/Dryland%20Farming.
pdf.
140. See id. Part IV.B.
141. See id. Part IV E.
142. See id. Part IV B; see also Jacobucci v. Dist. Court of Jefferson Cty., 189
Colo. 380, 388 (Colo. 1975):
Because the right seeking to be condemned, the right to make beneficial application of the water, does not belong to the corporation,
but to the shareholders, the mutual ditch corporation cannot be
the only proper representative of the shareholders’ interests. . . .
Mutual ditch companies like Farmers were formed expressly for
the purpose of furnishing water to shareholders, not for profit or
hire. . . . These companies are not organized under the general
Colorado corporation statutes, but under special legislation for
ditch and reservoir companies.
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water rights were granted strictly for agricultural use over a
relatively small geographic area that may not include significant urban centers.143 Under these circumstances, changing the use and the place of use will require the parties to
go through the cumbersome statutory transfer process.
States should recognize the natural advantages that
these organizations share with the CBT project and the
opportunities that would arise if they had more flexibility
to transfer water rights outside the current transfer system.
As previously argued, granting water organizations an easier path toward transfers would, at a minimum, require
that their consumptive rights be clearly defined. But once
that is done, states could use a streamlined transfer process to allow mutual ditch companies and water districts
to transfer consumptive rights outside their districts and
for new uses.144 This would open up these entities to more
robust marketing opportunities that could resolve many of
our current urban water needs.

D.

Promote Temporary Transfers

In recent years, much attention has been paid to the potential for temporary transfers to solve long-term water needs.
While such transfers could be short-term or long-term,
they are all distinguished by the fact that the party holding
the water right does not relinquish her ownership interest.
For farmers concerned about the long-term health of
their rural communities, this is a very attractive feature.
As previously described, successful real-world examples of
temporary transfers already exist, including the PVID’s
rotational fallowing program that provides water to the
MWD,145 and the Arizona Water Bank, which allows Las
Vegas to bank groundwater in southern Arizona.146 But
widespread use of temporary transfers is unlikely to occur
unless states adopt legislative reforms designed to promote
their use.147 The three primary temporary transfer mechanisms—rotational fallowing, dry year options, and water
banking—are described briefly below, along with policy
reforms that could lead to their expanded use.

1.

Rotational Fallowing

As a tool for moving more water from agricultural to
urban use, rotational fallowing has much to recommend
See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §7-42-101 (2011).
143. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 62, app. F.
144. Compare, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §9-432 (2011); Cal. Water Code §§1050510505.5, 11460; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-45-118(1)(b)(II) (2011);
Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-290 (2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §533.438(5)
(2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-5-29 (2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 82 §§105.12,
1086.1 (2011); Texas Water Code §11.085 (2011); Wyo. Stat. §41-3-104
(2011).
145. As noted in the Super Ditch discussion, the PVID’s fallowing program was
instrumental in inspiring proponents of the Super Ditch concept. See notes
107-14 and accompanying text.
146. See Winner, supra note 107.
147. See, e.g., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Alternative Agricultural
Transfer Methods Grant Program Study 45-46 (May 2011), available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-supply-planning/
Pages/main.aspx (explaining that legislative changes may be necessary to
remove the barriers to water transfers in Colorado).
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it. Farmers who participate in the program agree to fallow a portion of their land, and can thus continue to farm
on the remaining land, focusing their efforts on the most
productive lands, or rotating the fallowed land from year
to year.148 The unused water made available by fallowing is
then leased to a municipality.149 The MWD/PVID rotational fallowing program is usually cited as a model for
such programs, and for good reason. Despite the fact that
the program moves a substantial volume of water from
agricultural to urban use, it is remarkably simple, with
one large buyer and one large seller who happen to have
very senior water rights.150 The Super Ditch proposal may
suggest the more typical model, but it remains to be seen
whether that proposal will ever come to fruition. Several
legal reforms, however, could help make rotational fallowing programs like the Super Ditch more practical.
First and foremost, some progress must be made to
streamline the normal water transfer process. The effort
needed to design a program like the Super Ditch Company, with its many potential sellers and multiple buyers,
is substantial and expensive, yet the parties have no assurance that their efforts to transfer the relevant water rights
will make it through the formal transfer process within
a reasonable length of time. Moreover, it seems possible,
perhaps even likely, that objections to the transfer will be
filed and may succeed in limiting the amount of water
available under the program, even if the transfer is ultimately approved.
Even if a state is not ready to embrace a wholesale shift to
defining water rights in terms of consumptive use, it might
consider doing so in the case of temporary transfers. For
example, the state could authorize the prospective seller to
apply to the appropriate agency official for a consumptive
use determination. The seller might even be asked to bear
the cost of the determination. Once the determination is
made following a process such as that suggested above,151
the state could authorize the temporary transfer of the
consumptive right. As suggested previously, such temporary transfers might further be conditioned to reduce the
transfer by 10% to protect stream flows and to account
for potential calculation errors, but they would follow a
minimal process, as proposed more generally for consumptive use transfers.152 The law might also provide for minor
adjustments to the consumptive use allocation to reflect
actual experience once the program has been operating for
several years.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id.
150. The LAVWCD established the Super Ditch Company to act as a facilitator
for the collective leasing of water rights between municipalities in southeastern Colorado and individual shareholders of different ditch companies, see
Peter D. Nichols, Memorandum to Water Tables Regarding the Super Ditch: A
Temporary Water Leasing Alternative to Historical Permanent “Buy and Dry”
or Irrigated Land in the Lower Arkansas Valley ¶ B (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter
Memorandum to Water Tables]; see also Teresa A. Rice & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Agricultural to Urban Water Transfers in Colorado: An Assessment
of the Issues and Options, Colorado Water Resources Research Inst., at 71
(1993).
151. See note 114 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
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Second, state law must allow these rotational fallowing
programs to operate over a long period of time consistent
with the planning needs of municipal water suppliers.
Without some assurance that these programs will offer
long-term water security (at least 30-40 years with provisions for renewal), cities are unlikely to find rotational fallowing an attractive option.153

2.

Dry Year Options

Dry year options, or interruptible water supply agreements,
operate much like an emergency water supply.154 A city may
contract with a farmer to take that farmer’s water during
dry years that meet certain criteria spelled out in legislation,
or preferably in the option contract. This allows the city to
avoid acquiring a much more costly permanent water supply where the water resources might be needed only once
every 10 years. As with rotational fallowing agreements,
this strategy will be viable for municipal suppliers only if
the parties are willing and able to enter into long-term contracts of at least 30-40 years with some assurance of an
opportunity for renewal. If a city cannot secure a long-term
commitment of access to water resources in dry years, it
lacks an incentive to negotiate the option contract.
The Colorado interruptible water supply agreement statute155 offers a useful example of how not to establish a dry
year option program. Under that law, a water owner may
agree to forego her use of a water right during a dry year as
provided under the terms of the agreement, and the State
Engineer may approve and administer such agreements
without the need for the formal adjudication that would
otherwise be required for a water transfer.156 The State
Engineer must, however, ensure that existing water rights
would not be injured when the option is exercised, and
furthermore must: (1) quantify the historical consumptive
use of the water right, which then forms the basis for the
option amount; (2) describe the land where the water is
decreed for use; and (3) approve a plan for proper management of the land during the period when it is fallowed.157
Although strict adherence to the no injury rule could
prove problematic, for reasons already discussed, these are
generally sensible requirements that could promote more
streamlined decisions on these agreements.
Unfortunately, the statute goes on to limit the length of
time for any agreement to 10 years, which can be renewed
only once, and then only if the option has never been
exercised.158 For a city seeking a secure water supply, this
153. Alternative Agricultural Transfers, supra note 147, at 5 (explaining
that if a rotational fallowing agreement were used to provide water for a
growing municipal demand, the agreement would need to be “. . . longterm, renewable, or even perpetual. . . .”).
154. See generally Dry-Year Water Supply Reliability Contracts: A Tool for Water
Managers, supra note 101.
155. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §37-92-309 (2011).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 309(3)(b).
158. Id. at 309(3)(c). The statute also provides that the option may not be exercised in more than three of the 10 years of the agreement. While this could
be a limiting factor in the utility of these agreements, it is understandable
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limitation makes the Colorado interruptible water supply
agreement statute unworkable.159
Fixing the Colorado statute would not be especially difficult, and it suggests the contours of the law that might
be adopted in other states. At a minimum, states should
make clear that de minimis injuries that might result
from exercising a dry year option are not actionable in
court. Actionable injuries should specifically be defined to
exclude a change in the timing of return flows. Even more
explicitly, the statute could simply provide that where the
state approves the transfer of the historic consumptive use
of a water right, perhaps less 10%, no injury to existing
users shall be found. Without some provision like this, the
parties to any such agreement face the prospect of transaction costs that are essentially as high as those for regular
water transfers.
States should also allow option agreements to last for
at least 30 years, perhaps longer, with the possibility of
renewal for additional 30-year terms. Municipal water
suppliers cannot plan for future water needs unless they
have some certainty about the availability of future supplies. A well-defined option right can provide that assurance. Guaranteeing the availability of an option right over
a 10-year period, as authorized by the Colorado statute, is
simply not adequate to incentivize municipal suppliers to
negotiate an agreement.

3.

Water Banks

Water banks have been described broadly to encompass
“an institutionalized process . . . to facilitate the transfer
of developed water to new uses.”160 This definition, however, could be viewed as encompassing many other types of
water transfers, including rotational fallowing and dry year
options. Moreover, the definition fails to convey the sense
that water banks typically involve only temporary water
transfers. A more nuanced definition that better reflects
the term “water bank” might describe it as a program that
establishes a repository or “bank” where parties can store
water, together with a program for other parties to withdraw water from the bank.
Water banks have been around for many years, dating
back to the early 1930s in Idaho.161 The earliest legislation,
also from Idaho, was enacted in 1979.162 Since then, many
other states have adopted some form of water banking.163
Like other forms of temporary water transfers, water banks
can help make water supplies available to meet critical
that the state would want to avoid having parties use this provision to accomplish something that looks more like a permanent transfer of the water.
159. Two minor applications were currently pending before the State Engineer,
but at the time of this writing, no interruptible supply agreements have yet
been approved under this provision. Telephone Interview with Joanna Williams, Water Resource Engineer, Colo. Div. Water Res. (July 6, 2012).
160. Lawrence MacDonnell, Water Banks: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Western Water, 41 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 22-1 (1995).
161. MacDonnell et al., Using Water Banks to Promote More Flexible Water Use,
Final Report, U.S. Geological Survey Award: 1434-92-2253 (1994).
162. Idaho Code §42-1761-1766 (2011).
163. Analysis of Water Banks, supra note 101.
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needs, especially during dry years. They can also help promote conservation by providing water owners with a venue
to market water supplies that they are able to conserve,164
and by providing conservation groups and states a source
for water needed to protect stream flows and fisheries.
Water banks can simply involve a paper transaction
where, for example, water sellers answer a call from a
buyer to forego the use of water to which the sellers are
entitled.165 This might happen where a party interested in
protecting stream flows purchases natural flow rights from
a seller for a period of one or more years. More commonly,
water banks involve physical storage, either in a reservoir
or underground. Water banking in this situation might
typically involve a water district with excess storage capacity, willing to sell that capacity to parties with excess water
rights. The district might then help facilitate a sale of the
water to a third party, or perhaps issue credit to the original
owner that allows that original owner to take the water at
some later time, probably at some more convenient location on the stream. A good example of this latter arrangement is the Arizona Water Bank, which involves the state
of Arizona and the Southern Nevada Water Authority
(SNWA).166 Under this program, the SNWA pays the state
of Arizona to store Colorado River water in its groundwater aquifer. When the SNWA needs the water, it takes its
entitlement from its regular diversion point on Lake Mead,
well above the storage aquifers.167 Despite the apparent
advantages of water banks, there have been a surprising
dearth of successful banks,168 and, with limited exceptions,
they do not currently seem to offer a reliable solution to
municipal water shortage problems.
As with virtually every other recommendation set forth
in this Article, promoting water banks begins with better defining the water rights that are banked, so that they
can be readily withdrawn by interested buyers, even if
those buyers live outside the water district’s service area.
While the SNWA arrangement with Arizona is somewhat
unusual, it illustrates the high potential for water banks
to address municipal water needs. For example, the cities along the Front Range of Colorado are all near major
streams that flow out of the mountains. Some of that water
is used for municipal purposes; most is dedicated to farmers on the plains, who hold the most senior rights and who
are often part of large water districts or mutual ditch companies with significant capacity to store water. If these cities could purchase some storage capacity in the existing
reservoirs and solicit willing sellers in the service area of
the reservoir to dedicate some their water rights for use by
the city, the city could then be issued credits that would
allow it to divert that same amount of water at an outtake

near the city. Unfortunately, in Colorado, this transaction
would almost certainly have to be adjudicated in a state
water court, where it could be tied up for years. While
the process might be somewhat less cumbersome in other
states, the predominant no injury rule would still pose a
significant obstacle to completing any such transaction. A
streamlined transfer process for water bank transactions
that would allow a simple transfer of the consumptive use
amount less 10% could go a long way toward reinvigorating the water bank concept.

As described in the NCWCD case study,169 that District
has a huge advantage in moving water efficiently because
of the elaborate distribution system it has built, much of it
funded by taxpayers. Indeed, the District could not continue to operate without the one mill tax that it assesses
every year on all property within the District’s massive
service area. The NCWCD and the many other publicly
supported water districts throughout the West most likely
own and operate the very best water distribution systems
in the country, and they are able to do so in large part
because they are taxpayer-supported. As quasi-public entities, it seems appropriate that they share the use of distribution systems with excess capacity when third parties
might be in a position to use that system to transfer water
and thereby help address water supply needs for urban and
other uses.
Making excess distribution capacity available to third
parties would help promote efficient water transfers by
affording at least some water sellers a simple way to move
water from the location of its current use to the point of
new use. It could also generate revenues for the water district, although a process for setting reasonable prices for
wheeling water will have to be devised.
In 1986, California enacted a “water wheeling statute”
that essentially adopts the policy suggested here.170 That law
simply provides that “neither the state, nor any regional or
local public agency may deny a bona fide transferor of
water the use of a water conveyance facility which has
unused capacity, for the period of time for which that
capacity is available, if fair compensation is paid.”171
The law goes on to define such key terms as “fair compensation” and “unused capacity.” While evidence of
the statute’s use is anecdotal, the courts have thus far
construed the statute broadly to encompass not only
large systems such as aqueducts and canals, but also
local distribution systems.172

164. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 4. The Washington Department of Ecology describes this as “institutional banking.”
166. Id.
167. Storage and Interstate Release Agreement, supra note 124.
168. Analysis of Water Banks, supra note 101, at 16-18, tbl. 3. This report indicates that the only banks with high levels of activity are in California and
Idaho. In the case of Idaho, the water values are so low ($3-10.50/acre foot)
as to suggest that they are not serving municipal needs.

169. The District charges a delivery fee for each unit delivered, which can be
modified on an annual basis. See supra note 62.
170. Cal. Water Code §§1810-1814 (2011).
171. Id. §1810.
172. San Luis Coastal Unified School Dist. v. City of Morro Bay, 81 Cal. App.
4th 1044, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (2000). See also Metropolitan Water Dist.
of Southern California v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 96
Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (2000), where the court of appeal held that the wheeling

E.

Take Advantage of Existing Distribution Systems
to Move Water
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VI. Conclusion
Water markets have long been viewed as a promising
option for addressing water shortages, and as a tool for
meeting burgeoning urban water demand in the western
United States. But the traditional water laws of western
states make it difficult and in some cases even impossible
to operate efficient water markets. As a result, water transfers and water marketing have thus far proved to be tools of
limited utility for addressing the West’s future water needs.
As drought, climate change, and ever-increasing populations put more pressure on the West’s limited water supplies, some additional movement of water from agricultural
to urban use seems inevitable. But water marketing offers
the possibility of much more. With modest reforms to current law, water marketing could be an efficient and effective solution for most of the West’s future water resource

statutes did not preclude the MWD from including systemwide costs in calculating its wheeling rate, and furthermore that the statute did not require
the MWD to set its wheeling rates on a case-by-case basis as transactions
were proposed.
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challenges. And it could displace the need for destructive
water development projects that continue to plague water
resource management.
The reforms proposed here are politically challenging
but relatively simple to describe and implement. Most
fundamentally, water rights must be redefined in terms of
their consumptive use amount, and states must streamline
the process for transferring the consumptive use amount
without undue obeisance to the no injury rule. Such a
change would no doubt be controversial, but it could be
implemented strategically, either with pilot programs or by
adopting special legislation that would streamline transfers for particular projects that are proposing innovative
approaches to moving water. Water marketing has long
been a favorite topic of academics. The time for moving it
into the field is long overdue.

